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DUCCIO CAVALIERI 
(University of Florence) 
 
ON STOCK-FLOW CONSISTENT APPROACHES AND THE LIKE:  
THE ‘REDISCOVERY’ OF MODEL BUILDING. 
 
1.  A Copernican revolution in the theory of economic policy? 
There have been in recent times in the theory of monetary and fiscal policy frequent claims of 
substantial changes implying an abandonment of old-fashioned views and the adoption of new and 
better methodological perspectives. ‘Stock-flow consistent approaches’ (SFCA) to macroeconomic 
modelling, ‘modern monetary theory’ (MMT) and the like have been described as an epochal 
methodological revolution. Are they really such? Or are they ingenuous rediscoveries and doubtful 
‘remakes’ of past theories? This is the controversial subject of the present essay. 
SFCA and MMT are two popular schools of thought. They have been boasted by their 
promoters as innovative and heterodox post-Keynesian new generation methodologies, suited to 
provide a rigorous and internally consistent accounting framework for the analysis of a modern 
economic system, as a whole.
1
 But they have also been criticised as collections of familiar truisms: 
those that everything comes from somewhere and goes somewhere else, that flow variables 
cumulate over time into stock variables and that any source of income must have a counterpart, so 
that in a closed economy the financial inflows and outflows of the various sectors should sum up to 
zero.
2
 In the present essay we shall examine these features and distinguish SFCA from MMT. 
Let us first consider SFCA. It has been characterized as a post-Keynesian innovative 
macroeconomic approach based on stock-flow relationships, on the analysis of flows of funds 
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 For this characterization, see Godley and Lavoie, 2007, and Wray, 2012.   
2
 See Palley, 1994, for the charge of boasting as significant methodological innovations familiar truisms, resulting 
from well known national accounting identities. 
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between sectors, of interrelated sector balance sheets, of income statements and double-entry 
matrices. Its essence was authoritatively described by its proposers in these terms: 
“ T h e  m e t h o d  w i l l  b e  t o  w r i t e  d o w n  s y s t e m s  o f  e q u a t i o n s  a n d  
a c c o u n t i n g  i d e n t i t i e s ,  a t t r i b u t e  i n i t i a l  v a l u e s  t o  a l l  s t o c k s  a n d  a l l  
f l o w s  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  b e h a v i o u r a l  p a r a m e t e r s ,  u s i n g  s t y l i z e d  f a c t s  s o  
w e l l  a s  w e  c a n  t o  g e t  a p p r o p r i a t e  r a t i o s  ( e . g .  f o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  
n a t i o n a l  i n c o m e  t a k e n  b y  g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e ) .  W e  t h e n  u s e  
n u m e r i c a l  s i m u l a t i o n  t o  c h e c k  t h e  a c c o u n t i n g  a n d  o b t a i n  a  s t e a d y  s t a t e  
f o r  t h e  e c o n o m y  i n  q u e s t i o n .  F i n a l l y  w e  s h o c k  t h e  s y s t e m  w i t h  a  
v a r i e t y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a b o u t  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  a n d  
p a r a m e t e r s  a n d  e x p l o r e  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s ” . 3 
This concise description recalls a familiar method, that of system analysis, an interdisciplinary 
scientific methodology that has been seemingly applied by SFCA exponents and their fellow 
travellers without even mentioning it.
4
  
System theory is a fundamental part of the general theory of knowledge suited to be used in 
the analysis of the interdependent structural relationships among the interacting components of 
complex dynamic systems, in a holistic and evolutionary perspective, contrasting with 
methodological reductionism. It has an epistemological and ontological nature and provides a 
powerful methodology for problem solving in macroeconomics, management sciences and other 
disciplines, involving the use of mathematical, statistical and econometric techniques and of control 
theory
5
. The analyst adopts a strategic point of view, which enables the policymaker to take 
reasoned decisions in presence of  changing circumstances. 
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 Godley and Lavoie, 2007, p. 9. 
4
 The methodology of system dynamics modelling was developed in the first half of last century to handle complex 
dynamic problems involving heterogeneous types of interacting agents, by Bogdanov, Bertalanffy, Wiener, Vernadsky, 
Forrester, Bellman, and was recently further developed by Aoki, Yoshikawa and others. Useful handbooks on system 
dynamics modelling are those of Richardson and Pugh, 1989, and Hannon and Ruth, 2012.  
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 See van den Bosch and van den Klauw, 1994, Leigh, 2002, Richardson and Andersen, 2010. 
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As SFCA modelling, system dynamics implies a multi-stage approach. Once the problem to 
be analysed has been specified, a flow-chart – a detailed causal loop diagram – is usually initially 
traced to describe the qualitative nature of the problem in a non-mathematical way, by use of state 
variables (stocks), action variables (flows) and topologic directional connectors (lines and arrows). 
Continuous lines are used to indicate physical flows and broken lines for money flows.  
The next stage of the process is the construction of a mathematical model suited for a 
quantitative analysis, that is of a set of simultaneous accounting identities and behavioural 
equations. The model can then be used to make simulation experiments, in computer language. The 
further stage is particularly important, as it consists in making a dynamic behavioural hypothesis 
and in its testing and validation. The penultimate stage of the process of system dynamics implies 
debugging and checking the model, to be sure that it is well constructed. This is usually made by 
testing the sensitivity of the model to possible shocks and its dynamic stability. The last stage is that 
of assessing the predictive capacity of the model.  
Let us now compare SFCA and system dynamics. They use the same multistage modelling 
procedures and the same simulation approaches. Both of them involve the definition of problems in 
dynamic and sequential terms, the identification of stock and flow variables, feedback thinking and 
computer simulations. And both of them recognize the importance of nonlinearities and make use of 
difference equations in discrete time and of continuous differential or integral equations. Where is 
the difference? How innovative is the SFCA methodology? 
 
2. A neglected lineage. 
Modelling a dynamic system in economics requires first of all the specification of the system 
boundaries in time and space and of its stock and flow structure, that is of a set of equations which 
should describe how the flow variables are integrated over a time interval into the stock variables. 
To represent structural relationships and to evidence causal links, system dynamics makes use of 
stock-and-flow diagrams containing three types of conceptual elements: state variables (stocks), 
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reckoned at a single point in time and affected by the past behaviour of the system; action variables 
(flows), that influence the state variables; and data connectors (arrows, or causal loops).  
Production takes time, and so does selling the product. Different productions take different 
times. Time is an exogenous variable which crosses the system boundaries in the model. A correct 
specification of the time boundaries of the model and of the time-horizon of simulations is essential. 
A similar remark can be made as concerns the level and extent of aggregation in homogeneous 
sectors. Their size is an important analytical dimension. 
The use of social accounting matrices (SAM) as a conceptual framework for macroeconomic 
modelling is not a novelty. It has been practiced since a long time in system dynamics approaches. 
There is a wide literature on the subject.
6
 A SAM is an expanded input-output square matrix in 
which transactor payments and receipts are respectively reckoned in columns and rows. For each 
account or subaccount the sum of all payments must equal the sum of all receipts. A last row is used 
to show the combined capital account and one row can be dropped for reasons of redundancy. 
In SFCA the use of SAM is a peculiar one. Production is demand-driven and there are no 
capacity constraints on the supply side. Whatever is demanded within a period is supposed to be 
produced and sold in it. There can be no inventories of unsold products. This conceptual framework 
can be used to study the effects of exogenous changes, such as an increase in government 
expenditure or a rise in exports, through a multiplier analysis. A validation procedure is needed to 
test the internal consistency of the theoretical hypotheses and the behavioural assumptions of the 
model.  
Particularly important is a correct parameter identification, that is the initial attribution of 
numerical values to the parameters of the variables in the simultaneous behavioural equations that 
reflect the motivations of economic agents and the constraints they must face. There are countless 
equivalent sets of plausible numerical values of structural parameters. The results of the model are 
sensitive to their choice. They should possibly be based on observation, and reflect empirical or 
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experimental statistical data, rather than be rationally estimated by system methods and calibrated 
on the base of a benchmark year social accounting matrix. In any case, they should not be assumed 
as scale invariant. System dimensions are relevant.  
A specific problem arises from the SFCA ambiguous reference to a steady state equilibrium 
implying constant relations between stocks and flows, to which the economic system is supposed to 
tend in the very long-period. Can the long-run configuration of the economy be taken as 
predetermined. Is this rational? Multiple and unstable equilibria, suited to be described by 
probability distributions, and chaotic behaviour should not be excluded.  
We know that it is easier to compare different policies implying steady states. But is this a 
sufficient justification? Is there really a need to condition the analysis to the existence of steady-
state equilibria, in which the rates of flows and the levels of stocks are stabilized? How should this 
take place: through changes in government expenditure, or in interest rates?  
Other problems in SFCA are related with the opening, the closure and the solution of the 
models. A basic assumption of theories of endogenous money supply is that at the outset there 
should not be an initial stock of money. Credit money creation, endogenously determined, should 
take place later, in form of interest bearing loans, fictitious deposits and overdrafts. It would not, 
however, be free of exogenous connections. The existence of fiat money should be presupposed, to 
meet reserve requirements. 
The equilibrium closure of the model can take different forms, that depend on the specific 
nature of the behavioural equations of economic agents, clustered in homogeneous functional 
categories and unrealistically supposed to obey constant behavioural rules
7
, to have complete 
information and rational expectations. In SFCA agents do not learn from experience and do not 
adapt their conduct to changing circumstances and government policies. 
                                                          
7 Key closure rules are those concerning the adjustment mechanism relating savings and investments, or the 
attainment of the balance of payments equilibrium under fixed or flexible exchange rates regimes. 
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To solve the model, its equations must be written in structural form; not in the easier to 
estimate reduced form, in which the values of endogenous variables depend only on those of the 
exogenous variables and on possible lagged values of endogenous variables. The solution of models 
in reduced form can provide information on the sign of functional relationships, though not on their 
magnitudes.   
Other analytical shortcomings of SFCA must also be mentioned. The relations between the 
macro and the microeconomic levels of analysis are not specified; the degree of industrial 
concentration and that of capacity utilization of firms are ignored; banks are not distinguished from 
non-banking financial institutions; and there is no room for heterogeneous agents’ conduct at the 
microeconomic level. The central bank is supposed to act as a price-setting monopolist in the 
money market, that is to fix its nominal lending interest rate (the rental price of base-money) and to 
be then committed to provide commercial banks on demand, at that rate, with any amount of base-
money they need to meet possible reserve requirements. Because of this alleged accommodative 
lending behaviour of the central bank, the supply of money is considered of endogenous nature. 
This can be questioned. Clearly endogenous, at the macroeconomic level, is only the real supply of 
money, that is the nominal supply divided by an index of the price level.  
Solving the model involves further assumptions, such as the convergence of the economy 
from its given initial conditions to a steady-state long–run equilibrium. What happens if the model 
does not converge to a steady state equilibrium solution? There are, thus, in SFCA various problems 
to be solved. SFCA is a useful methodological instrument for macroeconomic modelling, but no 
more. It is neither a methodological revolution nor a must And it is not the only stock-flow 
consistent approach to macroeconomic modelling. DSGE neoclassical and new Keynesian models 
are also stock-flow consistent.  
In spite of these considerations, some policy conclusion of SFCA can be easily shared. The 
main one is that monetary policy alone cannot maintain full employment and a low inflation rate for 
a sufficiently long period, unless it is appropriately supported by fiscal policy.  
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Fiscal policy, however, should be carefully used. It affects people’s spending behaviour and 
can determine crowding out effects and a misallocation of loanable funds, if it is practiced above 
full employment. 
 
3.  SFCA and MMT: a comparison. 
MMT, or neo-chartalism, should not be confused with SFCA. SFCA is essentially a set of 
methodological rules to be used for descriptive and forecasting purposes, MMT is something more. 
It has a prescriptive nature. It is a policy proposal to escape from austerity by unbalancing the 
government budget.
 8
  
As SFCA, MMT has been presented by its proponents as a stock-flow consistent innovative 
post-Keynesian approach. A methodology that would have uncovered how money really works in a 
modern sovereign economy.
9
 It is claimed that MMT brought the government sector into the simple 
triangular agent-based monetary circuit involving firms, banks and households, with the intention to 
highlight a prominent responsibility of the government in policy making.  
The fundamental proposition of MMT is that in a sovereign country with fiat money and a 
flexible exchange rate there are no financial constraints on government deficit spending. The 
government sector would not be financially constrained. It would not need to tax or borrow to 
collect financial resources. In other words, it would be technically self-funding. It would never risk 
to run out of money, because of its power to print money and be solvent.  
It is maintained that as a consequence of this alleged unlimited ability to pay without bearing 
costs, the government of a sovereign country could act as a job guarantee and an employer of last 
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 MMT is also known as ‘Mosler’s economics’. Warren Mosler is a hedge fund manager, co-founder of MMT. He is 
a financial supporter of the headquarters of the SFCA circle, the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, N.Y., a 
research institution and influential policy think-tank. 
9
 See Wray,: “To put it simply, we have uncovered how money ‘works’ in the modern economy” (Wray, 2012, 
preface, p. 9). 
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resort, at a minimum wage rate. For MMT, below full employment government deficit spending 
does not matter, since there are no financial limits to printing state money.  
MMTers claim that no financial crisis would be so severe that it cannot be faced by a 
sufficiently large increase of government deficit spending. This is technically correct, but hides a 
dangerous illusion. Financial limits do not exist, and they should not be legally imposed, but real 
limits are always present, for the scarcity of productive resources. Their inobservance causes 
inflation.
10
  
Two basic hypotheses of MMT are that there cannot be taxation without previous government 
spending which should provide the private sector with the fiat currency required to pay taxes, and 
that there is a need for a ‘consolidation’ of the activities of the Treasury and the central bank,  
which have distinct functions but can work in association for stabilising purposes.  
MMTers maintain that the consolidated budget of the government sector of a monetary 
sovereign country can be permanently in deficit. They say: ‘Never mind of budget deficits’. They 
are useful, they stimulate the economy and enrich people, as they increase private wealth, and do 
not have to be repaid.  
Let us therefore consider how the financing of a budget deficit can take place. There are three 
principal methods: printing money, taxing, and borrowing.
11
 Printing creates new base-money. It 
may be substituted or complemented by taxation, that is by a destruction of base-money, and/or by 
issue of Treasury bonds, that is by creation of new financial assets. It is important to understand 
how these operations intersect and how they affect the lending rate.
12
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 The productive or unproductive quality of government spending should also be considered. Unproductive 
spending would increase the risk of inflation.   
11
 There is also a further alternative: that of doing nothing to finance the current budget deficit, add it to the pre-
existing debt, pay interests on it, manage it and shift the burden of the debt on future generations. 
12
 Government borrowing or printing new money will probably lead to an interest rate increase and thus determine a 
crowding out effect on private investments. But while government borrowing drains liquidity from the market, and thus 
has a deflationary effect, printing new money is inflationary. 
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Treasury bonds must be sold to the private sector, which for this purpose needs additional 
reserves, that the monetary authority should supply. Government spending adds to commercial 
banks reserves and to people’s demand deposits, but borrowing by selling new Treasury bonds 
drains liquidity from the market. The relevant point thus is how these two operations involving 
opposite movements of funds should be coordinated over time.  
What is the direction of this particular monetary circuit? Does government spending 
necessarily come first and taxation or bond issuing follow later on, as assumed by MMT, or vice 
versa? In the first case, there would be a provisional increase of net private financial wealth; in the 
second case, a provisional decrease. But the final effect would probably be neutral.  
MMTers make large use of the accounting structure of SFCA and of its modelling methods. 
But MMT should not be regarded simply as a special branch or application of SFCA, paying special 
attention to the role of financial markets. Unlike SFCA, which has an analytical nature and is 
fundamentally descriptive and policy-neutral, MMT is an ideologically committed normative 
approach entailing specific policy recommendations. As a permanent budget deficit of the public 
sector, the assignment to the government of the role of ‘job guarantee’ and employer of last resort, 
and the reject of any proposal of getting growth through austerity.  
In spite of its name, MMT is not a theory; even less a post-Keynesian theory. It is not 
intended to provide a unified body of knowledge and is not in line with Keynes’ own views. Keynes 
opposed the classical myth of the annual balancing of the budget, but did not favour a permanent 
and unlimited deficit spending. He advocated deficit spending only during a recession, followed by  
a budget surplus during the subsequent boom, in such a way to balance the budget over the business 
cycle. Keynes was conscious of the risks of continuous deficit spending. MMTers, seemingly, are 
not. They argue that whenever the government sector prints new base-money and spends it, people 
are richer and happier, since government spending adds to net private financial wealth.  
10 
 
This is a naïve and dangerous misconception. Government spending by printing money to is 
not costless. It causes inflation and the purchasing power of people’s savings is reduced. There is no 
such thing as a free lunch.  
As an approach which favours government dirigisme, MMT is not ideologically neutral. But 
it should not be considered left-leaning because some of its leading exponents are such and full 
employment and economic welfare for everybody as primary goals. There are neoliberal and 
neoconservative variants of MMT implying less statist presence, no seigniorage prerogatives of the 
government sector and no preference for fiscal over monetary policy 
 
4.  Circuit theories: a crucial criticism. 
SFCA is considered by Lavoie and others as suited to provide a formal accounting 
legitimization to agent-based ‘monetary circuit theories’ (MCT), which should describe the 
creation, circulation and destruction of endogenous scriptural credit money. That is of a type of 
money devoid of intrinsic and legal tender value; thus unfit to be intentionally kept as a stock of 
liquid store of wealth.
13
 This is surprising because circuit theories are concerned with endogenous 
money, unlike SFCA and MMT, both of which highlight the role of the government sector in the 
creation of exogenous money. In my opinion, they should rather be seen as mutually exclusive.  
In MCT three categories of interacting agents – firms, commercial banks and households 
(firms’ workers) – are considered, in sequential order. It is assumed that at the outset bank loans, 
implying interest payments, are demanded and obtained by firms, that use the credit money to start 
their production activity. In a second stage, output is produced and output nominal prices are 
determined following a mark-up rule, which includes a profit margin. Then households are 
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post-Keynesians” ( 2007, p. 47). 
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supposed to spend the wage bill purchasing firms’ goods produced in the period and thus to allow 
the return to firms of some money.  
The relevant question is: the return to firms of how much money? The answer is 
straightforward: at most – in the limit case in which workers do not save and have no liquidity 
preference, but spend all their money buying firms’ products – the amount of the wage bill, which is 
less than the money value of output at mark-up prices. That is at most the money needed to repay 
the principal of their debts to the bank system. Though not to pay also the interests accrued in the 
meantime on the outstanding loans, as required for a regular closure of the circuit. This is the 
obtrusive ‘profit, or interest, paradox’, systematically neglected by circuit theorists.  
Let us have a look at the sequence of events typically considered by circuit theorists. They 
assume: 1) that firms borrow by banks some money – created ex nihilo by bank loans and implying 
interest payments – and use entirely this money as working capital, to pay production costs, 
including predetermined wages; 2) that this money is thus transferred from firms to households; 3) 
that when production is completed, firms set output prices under a mark-up rule, which includes a 
profit margin, and sell their products. It is also assumed: 4) that firms will get as receipts from the 
sale of output the whole amount of money spent to pay wages and other production costs, plus 
profits (this is erroneous); 5) that firms will be able to return the money previously obtained to 
banks, including interests, and thus to extinguish their debts; 6) that banks will then use interest 
payments to cover current costs and to purchase goods and firms securities.  
Let us consider these assumptions. Assumptions 1) and 2) and 3) do not need an explanation; 
they are sufficiently realistic. The crucial assumption, 4), is counterintuitive; it is entirely 
unjustified, because wage-earners can save part of their income and hold it, in liquid form, or in 
bank deposits and financial investments in equities. Assumption 5) follows tautologically from 
assumption 4) and is also unjustified. Assumption 6), on the spending behaviour of bank revenues, 
is irrelevant for the closure of the circuit; it concerns its reopening.  
12 
 
Assumptions 4) and 5) cannot be theoretically justified. How can workers, rewarded with a 
predetermined wage bill, be able to purchase firms’ products at prices that include a mark-up over 
prime costs? Under such conditions, firms as a whole can get back at most the money they initially 
paid for inputs. No more.  
This is, in essence, the profit or interest paradox. Attempts to solve this awkward paradox 
have been made in various directions by circuitists and their fellow-travellers. It was initially 
suggested to consider, instead of a single-period monetary circuit, a set of overlapping circuits, 
implying lagged reimbursements of bank loans in the long period (Parguez). Only part of the 
outstanding loans would thus be retired in each period. As pointed out by Rochon, this is not a 
solution. It does not involve the closure of the circuit, but a continuous deferment of the closure. A 
solution explaining the existence of profits should be found within a single period of production. 
As an alternative, it was suggested to assume that additional liquidity will be provided 
exogenously, by the State, through  budget deficits, or by the rest of the world, through the balance 
of payments. This is certainly possible, but is a typical deus ex machina solution and implies a 
burden which cannot be born for a long time.  
Lavoie noticed that it was necessary to assume that “the initial finance provided by banks to 
allow production is in all cases larger than the final finance requirements of firms at the end of the 
period”, thus pointing out that the initial bank loans should be larger than firms’ immediate 
financial needs.
14
 In this spirit, Zezza has gone so far to propose that the initial bank loans should 
cover the wage bill and interests.
15
  
Keen denied the existence of a profit paradox, arguing that “capitalists can borrow money, 
pay interest, and still make a profit”, since the flows initiated by the money borrowed by the firms 
over a year can circulate several times in one year. But he noticed that “the rate at which the bank 
transaction account turns over each year has to exceed the rate of interest on loans and the rate at 
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 See Lavoie, 2001, p. 14. 
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 Zezza, 2012, p. 159.  
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which the workers’ deposit account turns over has to exceed the rate of interest on deposits” 16. He 
took these assumptions as reasonable, but they are not.   
Other proposals made by circuitists and their fellow travellers were to assume that even 
workers can get bank loans; that some firms go bankrupt and do not reimburse their debts, while 
other firms make profits; to consider firms’ unsold commodities as an investment in inventories; to 
suppose that firms can reimburse their debts in kind; or that money can enter the circuit also 
through different bank loans, granted to households for consumer credit. None of these proposals to 
ensures a proper setting of the reflux phase. There is here a real problem; not a pseudo-problem.  
The problem was correctly perceived by Marx, who recalled a sort of reflux law of credit 
money formulated by Tooke and Fullarton, by which credit money was destroyed when bank loans 
were repaid and undesired excess liquidity was not held. In the introduction (‘Einleitung’) to 
Grundrisse (1857-58) and in Capital, volume II, Marx significantly pointed out that “the class of 
capitalists cannot extract from the circulation what has not previously been thrown in”.17  
 
6. A theoretical perspective of monetary theory and policy. 
Post-Keynesian economists have paid large attention to the behaviour of the central bank and 
the whole banking system in a modern monetary economy. Their approach is that of money 
endogeneity, suggested by Kaldor to contrast monetarism and developed later on by Basil Moore 
and others. Banks are supposed to act as an efficient transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
and to accommodate systematically people’s demand for credit. 
The fundamental issues of the controversy which opposes money exogeneists to money 
endogeneists are the direction of causality in monetary theory and the controllability of monetary 
policy in an institutional framework characterized by the presence of both outside (fiat) and inside 
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(credit) money. What is lacking is a shareable theory of the behaviour of the central bank and the 
banking system. Do commercial banks receive the reserves of base-money they need, implying 
interest payments, from the central bank and then lend out credit money with a mark-up rental price 
to their customers, or not? Is the central bank lending behaviour a purely passive and 
‘accommodationist’ one?  
We shall hereafter try to recall – in a new Keynesian heterodox perspective, with nominal 
price rigidities, uncertain expectations about the future and non-neutrality of money – the basic 
guidelines of a realistic and unambiguous theory of banking behaviour. This task implies a refusal 
of new classical real business cycle theory and a confirmation of the theoretical and practical 
relevance of monetary and fiscal policy.
18
  
We object to the idea of an infinitely elastic money supply schedule. We propose to make a 
step up in the analysis of the problem, by considering the possibility of an active reaction function 
of the central bank and of a heterogeneous behaviour of individual banks as concerns the adoption 
of a reaction strategy to government monetary policy.  
It is indeed widely known that some banks first make loans and then look for the required 
reserves. The strategies adopted by banks differently capitalized, having different portfolio quality 
and with different risk-taking propensity or aversion, can be either accommodative or not. In 
general, highly capitalized banks tend to be more risk-averse.  In this way, they incur in minor 
losses in the case of a possible economic downturn. There is a positive relationship between the 
amount of capital of a bank and its level of risk aversion. A high level of capitalization provides a 
valid shelter in recession times. Low capitalized banks are more exposed.  
An accommodative lending behaviour of the banking system may be considered normal 
during expansionary cyclical phases; but the empirical evidence suggests that an activist and 
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 For the general lines of the new Keynesian perspective on monetary theory and policy, in which aggregate 
demand plays a determinant role, see Clarida, Galì and Gertler, 1999, and Walsh, 2010, ch. 8. 
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restrictive lending behaviour by low capitalized banks usually tends to take place during a 
recession. Banks’ severity in screening risky borrowers obviously increases in hard times.19 
 Our position does not involve a fully endogenous view of money supply and an 
accommodationist behaviour of the central bank. We think that when a commercial bank makes a 
loan to a creditworthy borrower, a fictitious deposit of equal amount, representing a bank liability, 
is created in the borrower’s account. The loan is a bank asset, the deposit a bank liability. The bank 
customer can withdraw the money borrowed, in the whole or in part. When the loan is repaid, the 
debt winds up and both the asset and the liability cancel out, for the lending bank and for the 
borrower.  
We maintain that bank loans do not create genuine but fictitious bank deposits (‘loan 
deposits’). Bank loans and fictitious deposits are created simultaneously, by double-entry 
bookkeeping. Hence commercial banks do not need reserves to make loans. They create out of 
nothing the endogenous money they lend, on their costumers’ demand, subject to reserve 
requirements set by the monetary authority, in the interest of bank depositors. The reserve regime 
reduce banks’ lending activity, by obliging banks to hold idle reserves, which subtract liquid 
resources to productive uses.
20
  
We do not share Palley’s idea that in the course of time the horizontalist position has 
gradually changed its characteristics and dissolved into the structuralists’s view, nor the statement 
that structuralists took over where horizontalists stopped, filling their omissions and oversights. The 
two approaches are antagonist and mutually exclusive. They are not different approaches to one and 
the same theory, the endogenous theory of money supply. Structuralists’ alleged fully endogenous 
money supply position is indeed doubtful. It should be proved, not simply asserted. In our opinion, 
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 See Thakor, 1996, Furfine, 2000, Ehrmann and others, 2003, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2003. 
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structuralism can only be considered as partially endogenous, because the central bank cannot be 
forced to provide as a lender of last resort additional reserves to the banking system.  
 
6.  The weak endogeneity of money supply. 
The monetary authority is a monopolist in the money market. As such, it can choose whether 
to control the quantity of money and take its rental price for granted, or to control the rental price 
and banks’ reserve requirements and take the quantity of money as endogenously determined. 
Monetarists opt for the first option. They are, so to speak, ‘money-supply exogeneists’ and ‘interest 
rate endogeneists’. They consider the central bank as the monopoly supplier of reserve balances and 
the supply of money as the key policy instrument, whose quantity is determined by the amount of 
money-base, under direct control of the central bank, times the value of a money multiplier, the 
reciprocal of the reserve requirement ratio, supposed stable. In their opinion, the velocity of 
circulation of money is constant and nominal income adjusts to equalize the demand for money to 
the supply, exogenously determined.  
Post-Keynesians, on the contrary, are ‘interest rate exogeneists’ and ‘money-supply 
endogeneists’. They assume that the direction of causality goes in the opposite direction, from the 
demand for money to money supply, which in their AD/AS models is endogenously determined, 
being the result of a passive, accommodative behaviour of the central bank and the whole banking 
system.  
To establish the nature of the nominal supply of broad money one has to consider the length 
of the time horizon and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to aggregate demand and 
other macroeconomic variables. While in the short-run the supply of money can be considered 
exogenously determined, in the medium and long-run endogenous credit money tends to assert itself 
as the dominant component of money supply, subject to the limits imposed by reserve requirement 
obligations. Fully endogenous is only the real supply of money – the nominal supply divided by an 
index of price level.  
17 
 
As concerns the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, in post-Keynesian theories it is 
supposed to take place through the impact of changes in money supply on interest rates and then 
through the complex effects of changes in interest rates on consumption and investment expenditure 
and, through the Keynesian multiplier, on aggregate demand and the level of income. In monetarist 
theories the transmission is more direct. It is based on wealth effects, due to the price changes 
originated by the attempts of economic agents to adjust their liquid balances to the desired levels, 
restoring the portfolio equilibrium between real and financial assets in the presence of changes in 
the supply of money, by varying the amount of the expenditure in goods and services. In the long-
run this should ensure a neutrality of money, through a non-neutrality in the short-run. 
The distance between the theoretical stances of monetarists and post-Keynesians on the nature 
of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy on aggregate income and expenditure, however, 
should not be overemphasized. There are not today, under inconvertible paper money regimes, 
transmission mechanisms that do not imply changes both of prices and of interest rates.  
The bi-directionality of the causal order between real and monetary variables is generally 
recognized. There are different views only on the time-length of changes in interest rates, which 
monetarists regard as destined to be rapidly offset by price changes, whereas post-Keynesians do 
not. 
In the ‘old view of money’, the supply of money was under full control of the monetary 
authority. Its amount was determined by multiplying the quantity of base-money, exogenously 
created by the monetary authority, by a stable money multiplier. The schedule of the supply of 
money was represented by a vertical line in the quantity of money-interest rate Cartesian space. 
Fundamentalist post-Keynesians, on the contrary, regarded the rental-price of base-money as set by 
the central bank, that would then be committed to create base-money out of nothing and to lend on 
demand at that price any amount of money to commercial banks. Bank reserves would therefore be 
created by the central bank on demand, after loans are made by commercial banks. At their turn 
commercial banks would be committed to satisfy the forthcoming demand for loans by credit-
18 
 
worthy costumers at the lending rate set by the central bank, augmented by a reasonable mark-up. 
The whole banking system would thus act as price-setter and quantity-taker.  
The traditional view according to which the monetary authority could control the stock of 
base-money, established after the first world war, was dismissed and it was maintained that not only 
the supply of base-money, but the whole process of money creation had to be treated as 
endogenous. The overall supply of money was therefore generally considered demand determined 
and represented by an infinitely elastic horizontal line, set at the current level of the interest rate. 
Banks were regarded as financially unconstrained. This was the description of a limit case, not the 
norm.  
Other post-Keynesians, the ‘structuralists’, took a less fundamentalist and more realistic 
stance in their opposition to the monetarism. They considered the economic system in its totality, 
focusing on the complex interrelations between its elements, and paid particular attention to 
economic agents’ liquidity preference and to the dual nature of money, a means of payment (a flow 
variable) and a store of wealth (a stock variable). They refused to share the idea of a systematic full 
accommodationist behaviour of the central bank, maintained that money supply does not 
necessarily adequate to money demand and regarded money supply as an upward-sloping schedule, 
instead of a horizontal one. The role of the demand for money was therefore enhanced and that of 
money supply downgraded. There could be credit rationing, due to banks’ liquidity preference. The 
search for equilibrium in the money market could be pursued through interest rates adjustments. But 
they would take some time to produce results.21  
For structuralists, banks are not financially unconstrained. The central bank can impose 
collateral requirements and penalty rates and can even refuse to lend. In any case, time would be 
required for accommodation and in the meanwhile expectations could change and financial 
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innovations, such as assets and liabilities management by banks, could take place. This is, in our 
opinion, a more realistic point of view, which is further enforced if one considers the analytical role 
played by Keynes’s finance motive for holding money, systematically underrated by endogeneists 
and neo-Keynesians. Cambridge Keynesians accept the idea that loans create deposits and deposits 
make reserves and think that as long as central banks choose to set their short-term lending rates, 
rather than to control directly the supply of base-money, the money supply as a whole can be 
regarded as an endogenous variable. They point out that the ratios between bank loans, deposits and 
reserves are nearly constant in historical time. Other structuralists take a less fundamentalist stance 
and support the idea of an upward-sloping supply curve.
22
  
The debate between horizontalists and structuralists went on for decades without reaching 
definitive results and clear policy conclusions. The limit cases of a vertical and a horizontal money 
supply schedule were gradually dismissed, but no unified post-Keynesian monetary theory 
ultimately emerged. Most structuralists are prepared to admit that the supply of credit money is only 
partially determined by the demand for bank loans. Hence not entirely determined. They think that 
the supply of base-money by the central bank is not always and necessarily accommodative. They 
prefer to adopt a sequential time framework, instead than a single period one, and they regard the 
liquidity preference of banks and their asset and liability management propensity as important 
factors in the analysis of the behaviour of the banking system.  
 
7. On the transmission mechanisms of monetary and fiscal policies. 
As a result of this formulation, the endogeneists’ fundamental assertions that the central bank 
is committed to create base-money and that commercial banks create deposits by their loans should 
not be completely abandoned, but should be correctly interpreted and qualified, with the purpose of 
reconciling the opposite views of money supply. Both of them include some elements of the other, 
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in form of exogenous or endogenous constraints.
23
 On one hand, the endogenous credit money 
created and destroyed by the banking system is subject to an exogenous constraint, represented by 
the given interest rate required by the monetary authority on its loans of reserve money. The 
sensitivity of the stock of money to interest rates is however questionable, because people’s demand 
for credit money in the form of fictitious deposits and bank overdrafts is not sensibly affected by the 
level of interest rates. On the other hand, the amount of the exogenous fiat money issued by the 
monetary authority is determined on the basis of the quantity of reserve money needed by the 
commercial banks and provided by the central bank or by other banks, through the interbank 
lending market.  
The conventional picture of the credit system is thus unfaithful. Banks are in business to lend, 
but in a market economy they are not forced to lend.
24
 Bank lending is a free activity. This state of 
things, as one can easily guess, has important policy implications.  
The role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy is fundamental. The central bank 
controls the money supply by raising or lowering the reserve requirement and by buying and selling 
bonds. Commercial banks create credit money, transform short-term liabilities into longer-term 
assets and provide securitization. They are not simple intermediaries between savers and borrowers.   
The transmission of monetary policy takes place through different channels. The most 
important are the credit channel, which operates through bank lending, and the bank capital 
channel, which affects the balance sheet. Other transmission channels are the interest rate channel, 
the exchange rate channel and the asset price channel, which affects the link between money and 
equity prices and determines wealth and real balance effects (crowding out effects). Their 
quantitative significance can be evaluated by calibration and simulation techniques. 
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Understanding how the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy operate is crucial for 
answering monetary and fiscal policy questions. The points we want to stress are that the bank 
lending channel does not imply an accommodative banking behaviour and that the fiscal policy 
transmission mechanism, which can affect both the demand and the supply side of the economy, is 
subject to short-run dynamic instability and implies important time lags in the response.
25
   
The consequences of this conceptual clarification are far reaching. They will be here recalled 
in a Keynesian theoretical perspective. Keynes did not refuse categorically the quantitative theory 
of money, but criticized its cash balances version. He indeed completed the Cambridge quantitative 
equation M = kY, where k is the proportion of Y held in cash balances, by adding to the transaction 
and the precautionary demand for money Lt(Y) and later on the demand for pre-financing real 
investments. The result of these Keynesian innovations has been the disappearance of the simple 
proportionality relationship between the demand for money and income, postulated by neoclassical 
authors, who considered only the commodity market (inclusive of the market of labour-power) and 
the money market. What Keynes did not accept was the rigid versions of the quantitative theory, 
where the demand for money was considered a stable function of nominal income.  
The reason of Keynes’s dissent was a twofold one. On one hand, he thought that in the 
presence of unemployed resources an increase in the quantity of money would not necessarily cause 
a rise in prices. It would rather tend to determine an increase in output. On the other hand, Keynes 
maintained that the impact on the price level of an increase of money supply could be offset by a 
rise in people’s liquidity preference, due to the reduction of the interest rate caused by the increased 
supply of money. In other words, Keynes thought that changes of money supply M would affect the 
values of k and i, rather than directly that of the price level p, which determined Y. The price level p, 
for Keynes, was determined by the cost of production and the profit margin. 
The traditional version of the quantitative theory – Fisher’s identity MV = PT – was untenable 
for Keynes, as it was based on the unrealistic assumption of constancy of the velocity of circulation 
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of money V and of the volume of output T and on the erroneous view of money as a simple means 
of exchange (a flow variable). We share his position. 
 
8.  Some policy implications. 
The policy implications of the present approach are clear. The monetary authority is not 
forced to adopt a passive and accommodating lending behaviour, but can regulate the supply of 
money, by observing a systematic policy reaction function, or by relying on discretional choices. It 
is this state of things that makes monetary policy a difficult subject.  
Conventional economic theory, expressed by the ‘New Consensus’ (NC) on monetary policy, 
asserts that in the presence of monetary growth targeting an appropriate policy-mix combination of 
a restrictive fiscal policy and an expansionary monetary policy would stimulate the economy, if 
there is no deficit in the balance of payments. A combination of a loose fiscal and a tight monetary 
policy would instead be appropriate in an open economy with flexible exchange rates and no 
balance of payments deficit. In the long-run no necessary trade-off between inflation and growth of 
output and employment would arise if the government policy choices were correctly anticipated. 
Monetary policy would simply affect the price level.  
A basic idea of NC is that once a policy rule is adopted to target the nominal rate of interest in 
the short period, active monetary and fiscal policies are no longer needed, because the economy will 
automatically move to its long-run equilibrium position. This is pure wishful thinking.
26
 As shown 
by Lucas’s, no systematic monetary policy has real effects, if it is correctly anticipated by economic 
agents. Only an erratically perceived policy produces real effects. But erroneous perceptions do not 
last indefinitely; sooner or later they tend to be corrected. The NC position involves a significant 
paradigm shift from a Keynesian approach. Fundamentalist post-Keynesians support a different 
                                                          
26
 See the critiques moved to the NC paradigm in Arestis and Sawyer, 2004, Arestis, 2007, and Hein and 
Stockhammer, 2007. 
23 
 
type of model, one in which money is non-neutral even in the long-run, when the Phillips curve 
tends to be upward-sloping, rather than vertical.  
The basic choice of a policymaker as concerns the intermediate objectives of economic policy 
is between targeting a monetary aggregate, as money supply or nominal GDP, and targeting interest 
rates. A distinction must be made, at this regard, between supply and demand shocks. In the case of 
demand shocks, a monetary targeting rule committing to dynamic consistency should be preferred 
in the presence of a stable demand for money, as it would cause less variability of output and price 
levels and would allow to choose between a policy privileging only the growth of output or both the 
growth of output and price stability, through inflation targeting. In the opposite case of shocks 
affecting the aggregate supply schedule, the supply of money, exogenously determined, moves in 
the same direction as aggregate supply. The monetary authority could thus choose a given interest 
rate and then adjust the supply of money to the demand for money, endogenously determined.  
All policy rules, however, have a serious drawback: they are inflexible and may generate time 
inconsistent results. Hence granting some limited discretionary room to the central bank seems 
preferable to the adoption of rule-based committed policy making.
27
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Abstract: Stock-Flow Consistent Approaches and the Like: The ‘Rediscovery’ of Model 
Building. 
This paper on the theoretical foundations of macroeconomic modelling pursues a need of 
conceptual clarification of a debated methodological problem concerning monetary and fiscal 
policies. In the first part of the paper the key features of Stock-Flow Consistent Approaches and 
Modern Monetary Theory are examined, in a critical perspective. These schools of thought consider 
the interaction between real and monetary factor at an aggregate level and re-propose with minor 
changes a well known system dynamics methodology, without implementing it and without even 
mentioning it. They rely on unrealistic and oversimplifying assumptions. Monetary circuit theories 
are also criticized. In the second part of the essay the guidelines of an alternative theoretical 
perspective are presented and their policy implications are discussed. Monetary and fiscal policy 
are not mutually independent. A reasoned choice of policy-mix is suggested.  
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